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COMMENTS ON NORTH CAROLINA 1957
SESSION LAWS
The discussion by the faculty of the School of Law of the University
of North Carolina of those statutes passed at the last session of the
North Carolina General Assembly which involve some legal problems
or which appear to be of some special significance for the members of
the bar is continued and completed below.:
The abbreviation "C." refers to a chapter of the 1957 Session Laws.
The abbreviation "G.S." refers to the current volumes of the North
Carolina General Statutes, together with the Cumulative Supplements.
ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES
PROCEEDS OF GRouP LIFE INSURANCE
G.S. § 28-213 formerly provided that the proceeds of group life
insurance, when not made payable to a named beneficiary, should not
constitute a part of the insured employee's estate for the payment of
debts. This meant that a decedent's creditors could not be paid out of
such proceeds even though all the other assets of the decedent's estate
were insufficient to pay them.2 C. 1361 amends G.S. § 28-213 to make
such proceeds a part of the estate of a decedent employee and available
for the payment of his debts-thus removing the differential, in this
respect, between group insurance and other insurance payable to the
decedent's estate.
UNKNOWN HEIRS OR NEXT OF KIN
The personal representative of a decedent, at about the time he is
ready to distribute the assets of the estate, may be confronted with the
fact that there may be heirs or next of kin of the decedent entitled to
share in the estate but whose names and residences are unknown. Ap-
parently, under G.S. § 28-160 the proper practice has been for the ad-
ministrator or executor to pay into the clerk's office "the shares of
legatees or distributees who cannot be located, or who are infants or
incompetents without guardian."8  In order to clarify the procedure in
* The first part of this Article appeared in 36 N.C.L. REv. 41 (1957).
* For further comment on the effect of this statute see McCall, Some Problems
in Administration of Estates, 35 N.C.L. REv. 341, 351 (1957).
'DOUGLAS, ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CAROLINA § 229, p. 181
(1948).
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such cases, C. 1248 amends article 17, chapter 28 of the General Statutes
by inserting a new section-G.S. § 28-160.1-between G.S. §§ 28-160
and 28-161. The new law provides that, before distributing the estate,
the personal representative is authorized to institute a special proceeding
before the clerk making all unknown heirs and next of kin of the decedent
parties thereto, they to be served with summons by publication. The
personal representative is not required, as a condition precedent to the
order of publication, to make affidavit that there are, or that he believes
there are such unknown persons, but only that there may be. When such
service has been made, the clerk shall appoint a guardian ad litem for
such persons, who files an answer in their behalf after summons served
on him. The filing of the guardian's answer brings them before the
court and binds them personally as to any payment or distribution made
by the decedent's administrator under orders of the court. The personal
representative and any sureties on his official bond are discharged to
the full extent of such payment or distribution as ordered. The new law
should expedite the administration of estates.
ESTATES OF MISSING PERSONS
C. 513 amends G.S. § 28-2.1 by striking out the provision which per-
mitted the administrator of a missing person's estate to administer both
the real and personal property of such person's estate, and by substituting
in lieu thereof a provision which authorizes the administrator to take
possession of and administer the personal property of the missing person,
including the proceeds of the sale of any interest in his real property
which has been sold by a mortgagee, trustee, or commissioner-which
proceeds may be in the hands of any clerk of the superior court,
mortgagee, trustee, commissioner, or any other person for the benefit
of the absent person. This amendment removed from G.S. § 28-2.1 the
unusual and anomalous provision in our law, which, in this one instance,
permitted an administrator to administer real property. Ordinarily,
the administrator of an intestate deceased person's estate has nothing
to do with the real property in the administration of the estate, unless,
where the personalty is insufficient to pay debts, it becomes necessary
for the administrator to petition for the sale of the realty to make assets.
No good reason appears for making any distinction in the administration
of a missing person's estate.
CONTRACTS
BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
C. 1229 amends G.S. § 52-12(a), relating to contracts of a wife with
her husband affecting the corpus or income of the wife's estate, by de-
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leting therefrom the provisions with reference to her personal property
and by specifically including therein separation agreements. Under the
statute as amended, no contract made with her husband affecting the
wife's realty or the accruing income thereof for more than three years
next after the making of the contract nor any separation agreement
between husband and wife shall be valid for any purpose, unless such
contract or separation agreement be in writing and be duly acknowl-
edged by the wife before a certifying officer who takes the privy examina-
tion of the wife according to the requirements formerly prevailing for
the conveyance of land. G.S. § 52-12(b) further requires, for the
validity of the contract, that the officer examining the wife shall in-
corporate in his certificate a statement of his conclusions and findings of
fact that the contract was not unreasonable or injurious to her. If
either this finding of fact or the privy examination is missing, the wife's
contract with her husband concerning the matters prescribed in G.S. §
52-12 is void.
Under the new law the wife may apparently contract normally with
her husband with reference to her personal property without any of
the former restrictions and requirements. However, since separation
agreements may involve personal as well as real property, even if the
wife's personalty alone is involved, such an agreement would, under the
amendment, seem to be void unless the two requirements mentioned
above were met.
C. 1229 also amends G.S. § 47-39 by adding to the acknowledgment
contained therein a provision regarding the privy examination of the wife
with reference to contracts or instruments signed by married women,
which come within the purview of G.S. § 52-12.
C. 1260 inserts a new section in chapter 52 of the General Statutes to
the effect that, if, since the execution of a contract between husband and
wife in which the certificate of acknowledgment fails to comply with
the requirements of G.S. § 52-12, a valid decree of absolute divorce
between the husband and wife has been rendered, no action shall
be maintained by her or any one claiming under her for the recovery
of the possession of, or to establish title to or any interest in,
any property described in such contract unless such action is com-
menced within seven years after the divorce decree has become final or
unless such action is commenced before May 1, 1958, whichever date is
later. The act does not apply to pending litigation.
Although it has been held that a conveyance of land by a wife to her
husband without compliance with the certification or probate require-
ments of G.S. § 52-12 is void, but may, nevertheless, serve as good color
of title,' yet it has been further held by the Supreme Court of North
1 Whitten v. Peace, 188 N.C. 298, 124 S.E. 571 (1924).
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Carolina that owing to the unity of husband and wife, adverse possession
cannot exist between them so long as the marital relation exists. But
where the marriage has been terminated by divorce, one may acquire
title from the other by adverse possession.2 Hence, under the new law,
unless the wife or those claiming under her bring suit to recover the land
from her husband within seven years after the decree of absolute divorce
becomes final, the husband's title will have ripened by seven years adverse
possession under color of title after the marital unity was severed by
absolute divorce. This, in effect, is a statute of limitation upon the wife's
right to sue, and serves to quiet titles to land.
CRIMINAL LAW
OBSCENE LITERATURE AND EXHIBITIONS
C. 1227, which is to be codified as G.S. § 14-189.1, represents the
legislature's most sweeping regulation of obscenity. This measure pro-
vides that it shall be unlawful to purposely, knowingly, or recklessly
disseminate, publish, or make available obscenity in the form of writing,
picture, record, play, dance, or other representation or performance
embodying obscenity. For its definition of "obscenity" the act borrows
the definition found in the Model Penal Code:'
A thing is obscene if considered as a whole its predominant
appeal is to the prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid in-
terest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or presentation
of such matters. Obscenity is to be judged with reference to
ordinary adults except that it shall be judged with reference to
children or other especially susceptible audience if it appears from
the character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemi-
nation to be especially designed for or directed to such an audience.
Preparation for unlawful dissemination or promotion of sale of obscenity
is also made a misdemeanor by the act. The dissemination, creation,
purchase, procurement, or possession of obscenity gives rise to a
presumption of knowledge of its obscene nature. The act does not apply
to public or private libraries or art galleries, and excluded from the
operation of the statute is dissemination, not for gain, (1) to personal
associates over sixteen years of age, or (2) by an actor under twenty-one
years of age to a child not more than five years younger, or (3) to
Kornegay v. Price, 178 N.C. 441, 100 S.E. 883 (1919).
1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10(2) (Tent Draft No. 6, 1957).
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institutions or individuals having scientific or special justification for
possessing it.
The United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Roth v.
United States,2 ruled that obscene matter is not protected by the first
amendment's guaranties of free speech and freedom of the press, and
inferentially approved the definition of obscenity proposed by the Model
Penal Code which is found in North Carolina's new statute; if the
constitutionality of this statute is called into question, it will probably be
for some reason other than that "obscenity" is so vaguely defined as to
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment or to infringe
upon the guaranties of the first amendment. This is fortunate, for the
history of litigation and the court decisions handed down in this country
indicate that the real socio-legal problem in enforcing obscenity statutes
does not arise in connection with literature, records, pictures, etc. which
are pure pornography (often termed "filth for filth's sake"), but in
connection with books such as Erskine Caldwell's God's Little Acre,
Edmund Wilson's Memoirs of Hecate County, a book entitled Married
Love, or James Joyce's Ulysses. The works listed all contain obscene
passages or language in "poor taste" aside from a general theme or
"message" which is acceptable, and have all been alleged to be obscene
literature and have been the subject of court decisions thereon.3
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ARREST
C. 1423 amends G.S. § 113-91 (g) to give the Commissioner of Game
and Inland Fisheries and his deputies authority to arrest without warrant
upon reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of the fish and game
laws is taking place in the presence of the arresting officer. Before
this amendment the section allowed arrest without warrant only when a
violation was actually committed in the presence of the officer. The
amendment brings this statute roughly into line with the 1955 amend-
ment of G.S. § 15-41, subsection (a) of which gives a peace officer the
authority to arrest without warrant when a misdemeanor is committed
in his presence, or when the officer has reasonable ground to believe that
a misdemeanor has been committed in his presence.
2 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See Note, 36 N.C.L. Ray. 189 (1958).
'Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948) ; United States v. One
Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) ; United States v. One Book
Entitled "Married Love," 48 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1933); People v. Viking Press,
Inc., 147 Misc. 813, 264 N.Y. Supp. 534 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 1933). God's Little
Acre was held to be obscene in Massachusetts, not obscene in New York and
Pennsylvania. Roth v. United States, stupra note 2, at 506 n.7 (dissenting
opinion).
For the history of the development of English law, see ST. JoHN-STEvAs,
OBSCENITY AND THE LAW (1956).
[Vol. 36
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HIGHWAYS
NOTICE TO PROPERTY OWNERS
G.S. § 136-55 requires the chairman of the State Highway Com-
mission or his duly authorized agent to notify the road governing au-
thorities of the county or counties before any change, alteration, or
abandonment of any road, maintained as a part of the state highway
system, may be made; it also requires that a map be posted at the court-
house door showing the old location of the road and the new proposed
location. However, no notice was required to be given to property
owners whose lands might be affected by such change, alteration, or
adandonment of the road. C. 1063 remedies this defect by adding a new
section to chapter 136 of the General Statutes-G.S. § 136-55.1. It
requires the State Highway Commission, at the time it notifies the road
governing authorities and posts the map, to give written notice by
certified mail to all individual property owners affected by the proposed
change or alteration of the road and to call his attention to the posted
map. It also requires publication of the notice in a county newspaper
once a week for four consecutive weeks; but if no newspaper is pub-
lished in the county, then the notice must be posted at the courthouse
door and four other public places for thirty days. Compliance with this
section shall constitute notice to all affected property owners. The new
law, effective as of January 1, 1958, is to be commended in that it
constitutes, simply, a matter of due process of law.
LIENS
AGRICULTURAL LIENS
G.S. § 44-52 makes provision for a crop lien in favor of any person
who makes any advance in money or supplies to any one engaged, or
about to be engaged, in the cultivation of the soil. This lien is given
preference over all other liens, except laborer's and landlord's liens,
to the extent of such advances. C. 999 amends this section by pro-
viding that the holder of such lien for agricultural advances to the tenant
acquires no right against the landlord unless the lienholder notifies the
landlord in writing of the existence of such lien prior to settlement be-
tween the landlord and tenant or sharecropper. The required notice
must give the office, book, and page number where the lien is recorded.
This amendment takes effect as of January 1, 1958.
It has been held by the supreme court that a landlord is liable to
account to persons who have a lien for supplies furnished for the value
of the crops in excess of the landlord's lien.' Apparently, under this
'Crnkley v. Edgerton, 113 N.C. 142, 18 S.E. 341 (1893).
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decision no other notice to the landlord regarding the existence of the lien
for advancement was required except the registration of the lien under
the provisions of G.S. § 44-52. Under the new law the holder of an
agricultural lien for advances acquires no rights against the landlord
for an accounting for the surplus, unless before the latter's settlement
with his tenant, the lienholder gives direct and specific notice in writing
to the landlord of the existence of the agricultural lien. This puts an
additional burden of alertness on such lienholder, and, without such
notice to the landlord, requires him to deal directly with the tenant after
settlement has been made.
OLD AGE ASSISTANcE LIENS
G.S. § 108-30.1 creates a general lien upon the real property of any
person who is receiving or who has received old age assistance to the
extent of the total amount of such assistance paid to such recipient from
and after October 1, 1951. C. 1107 amends this section by adding a new
paragraph thereto which authorizes the clerk of the superior court, upon
receipt of a statement from the superintendent of public welfare setting
forth the total amount of old age assistance received by the recipient
since October 1, 1951, to accept payment of the amount set out in the
statement, after giving reasonable notice to the county attorney, and to
cancel of record the lien on the recipient's real property. The clerk is
also required to give notice to the superintendent of public welfare of
receipt of such payment and of cancellation of the lien. The clerk must
hold or disburse the funds so received as required by law. Obviously,
this amendment creates the machinery whereby old age assistance liens
against the real property of the recipient may be cancelled of record.
G.S. § 108-30.2, as it appears in the Cumulative Supplement to
Volume 3 A of the General Statutes, provides for the action or pro-
cedure to be followed upon the termination of old age assistance by death
or otherwise. This section is amended by C. 1273 which provides that
the personal representative of a deceased recipient of old age assistance
shall not be a necessary party to an action to enforce the lien against the
recipient's realty if the clerk of the superior court finds that the deceased
recipient's personalty does not exceed $100; and that any funds remain-
ing after satisfaction of the lien shall be paid into the office of the clerk.
PROPERTY
ESCHEATS
C. 1105 was enacted to clarify the laws relating to the escheat of
real and personal property where the owner dies intestate without
leaving surviving any known heirs, relatives, or spouse to inherit such
[Vol. 36
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property. Both G.S. § 116-21 and G.S. § 116-22 are repealed and
rewritten.
G.S. § 116-21, before its repeal, stated the evidence required of the
University in making out a prima face case for the escheat of real
property, one of which facts to be proved was "that for fifty (50) years
subsequent to the death of the last known owner, no person has ap-
peared to claim the land as devisee, grantee or heir." The new G.S. §
116-21 provides, first, that whenever the owner of any real or personal
property located in this state dies intestate, or dies testate not having
disposed of such property by will, without leaving surviving any heirs,
kindred, or spouse to inherit such property, such real and personal
property shall escheat to the University of North Carolina. It will be
noticed that this new statute applies to both kinds of property, whereas
old G. S. § 116-21 related only to proof as to the escheat of land. It
also spells out the circumstances under which property escheats. The
new law also gives the University the right to institute a civil action in
the superior court of the county where the property is situated against
any administrator, executor, and unknown heirs and claimants as parties
defendant for the recovery of the property as an escheat. Unknown
heirs or claimants may be served with summons and notice of the action
by publication. The superior court is given authority to enter judgment
in the case declaring the property unclaimed to have escheated to the
University, and the real property may be sold according to the pro-
visions of G.S. § 116-20. The funds derived from such sale shall be
paid to the escheats fund of the University "where said funds, together
with all other escheated funds, shall be held without liability for profit,
or interest subject to any just claims therefor."
The new statute further provides that: "A default final judgment
may be entered by the Clerk of the Superior Court in such cases when
no answer is filed by the administrator, executor, unknown heirs or
claimants to the complaint, or if any answer is filed, the allegations of
the complaint are either admitted or not denied by such party defendants,
and no claim is made in the answer to the property left by said deceased
person."
The procedure outlined above has particular pertinence with reference
to the acquisition by the University of land by escheat. It prescribes
methods by which the University establishes, by court record, its title to
escheated land, which it may later sell by compliance with the provision
of G.S. § 116-20. It obviates the old and senseless requirement of the
University's having to prove that no person had appeared to claim the
land for fifty years subsequent to the death of the last known owner
thereof. As indicated above, the funds derived by the University from
the sale of escheated lands, as well as other escheated funds, shall be
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held by it subject to any just claims therefor. In other words, the
University holds such funds as trustee for any person who may present
a valid claim therefor. If through court action or otherwise a valid
claim is presented, the money is paid, without interest or accounting for
profit, to the claimant.
C. 1105 also repealed G.S. § 116-22, with reference to unclaimed
personalty left in the hands of personal representatives of decedents
who have died without heirs or next of kin, and enacted a new section
116-22 in lieu thereof. The new law provides that all sums of money or
other personal property remaining in the hands of the personal repre-
sentative when the administration of the estate of a person dying in-
testate, or partially intestate, without leaving any known heirs or spouse
to inherit the same, is ready to be closed, all such personalty unrecovered
or unclaimed by suit, by creditors, next of kin, or others entitled thereto,
shall, prior to the closing of administration of the estate, be paid or
delivered by the personal representative to the University as an escheat
and shall be included in the disbursements in the final account of such
estate. This changes the provision of old G.S. § 116-22 which required
the personal representative to hold such unclaimed funds for five years
before paying them to the University. The new statute, in these respects,
serves to expedite the orderly settlement of the decedent's estate. It
also authorizes the University to sue for and collect such property from
the personal representative after the estate is ready to be closed, or from
the clerk of the superior court if the unclaimed assets have been paid
over to him.
The provisions of new G.S. § 116-22 likewise are made to apply to an
administrator for the estate of a person who has been missing for seven
years, and who has been appointed administrator under G.S. § 28-2.1,
when the superior court shall find in an action brought by the University
of North Carolina that such missing person left no lawful heirs or lawful
claimants to the property of such missing person, and that such property
has escheated to the University of North Carolina.
C. 1049 amends G.S. § 116-23 by providing that all personalty (ex-
cept as otherwise provided in chapter 116 of the General Statutes) un-
claimed for three years after it becomes due and payable, shall be paid
or delivered to the University of North Carolina. The personal property
affected by the section, as amended, involves personalty of every kind
including dividends derived from corporations and joint stock com-
panies, choses in action, and sums of money in the hands of any person.
The new law reduces the unclaimed period from five to three years.
C. 1051 amends G.S. § 116-25, paragraph 1, by providing that all
unclaimed salaries and wages due any person from any firm or corpora-
tion within the state shall be paid to the University within one year from
[Vol. 36
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the time the same became due. The new law applies to unclaimed wages
due from any firm or corporation-not just to firms or corporations
engaged in construction work, as it formerly did. It is not applicable to
persons or businesses employing less than twenty-five persons.
C. 1050 amends G.S. § 116-23.1, relating to escheat of unclaimed
funds held by insurance companies, so as to include "monies payable
under annuity contracts or all dividends payable to holders of policies."
STATUS OF ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY OF MISSING PERSONS
C. 1426 amends article 22 of the General Statutes relating to the
estates of missing persons by adding a new section thereto-G.S. § 28-
197.1-to define the status of estates by the entirety when one of the
owners thereof has been missing for seven years.
G.S. § 28-197.1 provides that when a missing person is presumed
dead and so declared pursuant to the provisions of chapter 28, article 22,
of the General Statutes, all real estate held by such person as tenant by
the entirety shall vest in the surviving spouse in the same manner as if
the missing person, so presumed and declared to be dead, had died
a natural death, and the survivor can sell, convey, devise, mortgage,
encumber, or otherwise dispose of the property, as the sole and absolute
owner thereof. However, if the missing person reappears and files notice
of his return in the proceeding in which he has been found presumably
dead before the survivor has disposed of or encumbered the property,
such missing person may obtain a court order restoring the estate by
the entirety to its status prior to his disappearance. The new law
further provides that if he returns, makes an appearance in the pro-
ceeding, and files notice thereof after the execution by the "surviving"
spouse of a valid mortgage, deed of trust, or other security document or
after the acquisition of a valid lien on the property by any person, firm,
or corporation, then the missing person is entitled to a judgment re-
storing his estate by the entirety subject to such mortgages, liens, or
other encumbrances. Upon his return such hitherto missing person may
file notice of his return, together with a description of the real estate to
be affected by the further proceedings, in the lis pendens docket in every
county in which the realty is located, including the county in which the
proceeding is pending, as in the case of civil actions affecting the title
to real property as provided in G.S. §§ 1-116 to 1-120.1. The provisions
of the act do not apply to pending litigation.
This new law tends to clarify the status of estates held by the en-
tirety when one of the owners thereof has been declared dead after
being missing for seven years. One of the incidents of such an estate
is that upon the death of one of the spouses the entire estate passes by
survivorship to the surviving spouse. Unless there is some valid pro-
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cedure whereby a missing spouse can be declared legally dead, the other
spouse remains in a state of uncertainty as to the status of his title; and,
as a result, such title is virtually unmarketable. Under the new statute,
if the "surviving" owner sells or devises the property before the missing
spouse puts in an appearance and files notice, the purchaser or devisee
gets good title thereto; if the property is mortgaged or other valid liens
attach thereto, the returning owner takes the property-or his share
therein-subject to all valid encumbrances.
TRYING TITLE AGAINST THE STATE
C. 514 amends chapter 41 of the General Statutes by adding a new
section thereto-G.S. § 41-10.1. It provides that whenever the State
of North Carolina or any agency or department thereof asserts a claim
of title to land not acquired by condemnation, and any individual, firm
or corporation likewise asserts a claim of title to the land, such individual,
corporation, or firm may bring an action to determine title thereto against
the state or agency or department thereof in the superior court of the
county in which the land lies. The statute does not apply to lands con-
demned or taken for use as roads or for public buildings. This is a
useful statute since it permits a suit against the state to quiet title to
land claimed by it or by any agency thereof. It is comparable to and
supplements G.S. § 41-10, which permits an action to quiet title against
individual, personal adverse claimants.
REGISTRATION OF VOTERS
C. 287 rewrote G.S. § 163-28 as follows:
Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able to
read and write any section of the Constitution of North Carolina
in the English language. It shall be the duty of each registrar
to administer the provisions of this article.
Except for the words "of North Carolina," the first sentence of the
statute is identical with the language of the Constitution of 18761 and
with the governing statute,2 first adopted by the General Assembly in
1901. The second sentence of the above quoted statute is new, the
previous language of G.S. § 163-28 being,
Every person presenting himself for registration shall be able
to read and write any section of the Constitution in the English
language, and shall show to the satisfaction of the registrar his
ability to read and write any such section when he applies for
registration, and before he is registered.
'-N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 4.
2 G.S. § 163-28 (1952).
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As a qualification for exercising the privilege of voting, the literacy
test has been upheld as constitutional. In Guinn v. United States, the
Supreme Court said, "No time need be spent on the question of the
validity of the literacy test, considered alone, since as we have seen,
its establishment was but the exercise by the State of a lawful power
vested in it, and indeed its validity is admitted."3  In 1946, Alabama
amended its constitution by adding to its literacy test-persons qualified
to register as electors should be able to read and write any article of
the Constitution of the United States in the English language-words
requiring also the ability to "understand and explain" any article of the
Constitution. In Davis v. Schnell,4 a three-judge district court held this
qualification of "understand and explain" to be unconstitutional, be-
cause it does not furnish a reasonable standard whereby boards of
registration may pass on qualifications of prospective electors, but the
words are "so ambiguous, uncertain and indefinite in meaning that they
confer upon boards of registration power to register or refuse to register
whomever they please." 5  The court reiterated that the states have a
right to prescribe a literacy test for electors, but that state action which
denies due process and equal protection of the laws in the exercise of
the right of suffrage is prohibited by the fourteenth amendment and
that the fifteenth amendment guarantees the free exercise of the right
of franchise as against state discrimination based upon race or color.
In Allison v. Sharp,6 the North Carolina version of the literacy test,
G.S. § 163-28 above quoted, was held to be constitutional.
This is unquestionably a reasonable provision, and the registrar is
the logical person to carry out the provisions of the Constitution.
Then, again, the registrar has to pass on other qualifications of
the voter ....
We think the act of the General Assembly is constitutional.
If a registrar, in bad faith or in abuse of power or discretion,
should refuse to register one duly qualified, that is, when they
come within this constitutional requirement and other provisions
of the Constitution as to age, residence, sanity, citizenship, etc.,
then there is a remedy provided by law.
7
G.S. § 163-28, as amended by C. 287, that it shall be the duty of the
registrar to administer the provisions of this section, is clearly valid,
and the above-quoted language is applicable. C. 287 also adds three
3238 U.S. 347, 366 (1915).
'81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 336 U.S. 933 (1949).
81 F. Supp. at 877.
'209 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 27 (1936).
'Id. at 480-81, 184 S.E. at 29.
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new sections to spell out the "remedy provided by law,"8 G.S. §§ 163-
28.1-.3. G.S. § 163-28.1 provides that,
Any person who is denied registration for any reason may appeal
the decision of the registrar to the county board of elections of the
county in which the precinct is located. Notice of appeal shall
be filed with the registrar who denied registration, on the day of
denial or by 5:00 P.M. on the day following the day of denial.
The notice of appeal shall be in writing, signed by the appealing
party, and shall set forth the name, age and address of the appeal-
ing party, and shall state the reasons for appeal.
G.S. § 163-28.2 provides for the prompt filing by the registrar with
the county board of elections of such notice of appeal and a prompt and
fair hearing before the board on the question of the applicant's right
and qualifications to register. All cases on appeal to the county board
shall be heard de novo. A majority of the board is made a quorum for
hearing the appeal, but decisions must be made by a majority of the
total membership.
G.S. § 163-28.3 provides for appeal to the superior court by any
person aggrieved by the final order of a county board of elections. The
appeal must be brought within ten days of the date of the final order of
the county board and shall be heard de novo in the superior court, in
the same manner as other civil actions are tried and disposed of. From
the superior court, appeal may be taken to the supreme court.
These three sections provide the procedure to be followed by a citi-
zen who has been denied registration for any reason. The steps are (1)
appeal from the registrar to the county board of elections, (2) appeal
from the board to the superior court, and (3) appeal from the superior
court to the supreme court.
Formerly, aggrieved citizens could go directly to the superior court
from an allegedly wrongful refusal of the registrar to register them for
voting. The 1957 law introduces an intermediate step, appeal from the
registrar to the county board of elections. This administrative remedy
is desirable on its face, being prompt and inexpensive, but a question
may be raised as to its time limitation. Within approximately twenty-
four hours after denial of registration, a written notice setting forth the
name, age, and address of the appealing party and the reasons for ap-
peal must be filed with the registrar. In view of the circumstances, is
this a reasonable time limitation? The courts will not question the
legislative judgment unless the time allowed is manifestly so insufficient
that the statute becomes a denial of justice.0 Due process requires
1 Id. at 481, 184 S.E. at 29.
'Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 632 (1877); Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C.
563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919).
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adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. A hearing de novo before
the county board of elections supplies a fair hearing, if the time limita-
tion for appeal is reasonably adequate.
When the state law provides adequate administrative procedure for
the protection of "civil rights," federal courts should not interfere until
such administrative procedure has been exhausted and the intervention
of the federal courts is shown to be necessary.1 0 The administrative
remedy provided by C. 287 is appeal from the registrar to the county
board of elections. Appeal to the superior court is a judicial remedy,
and that is particularly true when the review in the superior court is by
a trial de novo before a jury. In Carson v. Warlick, 1 Judge Parker
made this clear, as follows:
[T]he appeals to the courts which the statute provides are ju-
dicial, not administrative remedies and . . . after administrative
remedies before the school boards have been exhausted, judicial
remedies for denial of constitutional rights may be pursued at
once in the federal courts without pursuing state court remedies.
Since the enactment of C. 287, Congress has passed the Civil Rights
Act of September 9, 1957,12 which is centered on the right to vote.
The original section of the Civil Rights Act of May 31, 1870,'" that all
citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote
at any election by the people in any state or territorial subdivision shall
be entitled and allowed to vote without distinction of race, color or
previous condition of servitude, is continued as subsection (a) of 42
U.S.C. § 1971. Four new subsections are added, as follows:
(b) No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise,
shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or attempt to intimidate,
threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering
with the right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may
choose, or of causing such other person to vote for, or not to vote
for, any candidate for the office of President, Vice President,
presidential elector, Member of the Senate, or Member of the
House of Representatives... at any general, special, or primary
election held solely or in part for the purpose of selecting or elect-
ing any such candidate.
(c) Whenever any person has engaged or there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any person is about to engage in any act
or practice which would deprive any other person of any right or
privilege secured by subsection (a) or (b), the Attorney General
"0 Carson v. Board of Education, 227 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1955).
"238. F.2d 724, 729 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
1271 STAT. 634, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1975a (Supp. 1957).
16 STAT. 140 (1870), often referred to as the Ku Klux Act.
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may institute for the United States, or in the name of the United
States, a civil action or other proper proceeding for preventive
relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary in-
junction, restraining order, or other order ....
(d) The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdic-
tion of proceedings instituted pursuant to this section and shall
exercise the same without regard to whether the party aggrieved
shall have exhausted any administrative or other remedies that
may be provided by law.
Subsection (e) requires that persons cited for an alleged contempt
under this act be provided with counsel and with compulsory process
to secure witnesses. Section 151 of the act provides trial by jury for
proceedings to punish criminal contempts of court growing out of civil
rights cases.
A new subsection (4) is added to 28 U.S.C. § 1343, as follows:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief
under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights, including the right to vote.
While the doctrine of exhaustion of state administrative remedies
does not apply specifically to actions instituted by the Attorney General
under 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (c) and (d), it appears that exhaustion of state
administrative remedies is still a prerequisite to individual actions
brought in the federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343.
The registrar, under C. 287, continues as the key person to ad-
minister the provisions of the North Carolina Constitution and statutes
concerning qualifications of the voter. As stated by the North Carolina
Supreme Court, "If a registrar, in bad faith or in abuse of power or
discretion, should refuse to register one duly qualified . . .then there
is a remedy provided by law.' 14 The remedy is spelled out by C. 287,
with three stages for appeal from the registrar's adverse decision and
the opportunity at each stage to correct any discrimination based solely
on the race or color of the prospective voter.
TAXATION
INcomE TAx
1. Allocation of Interstate Corporate Income
The most publicized-and from the fiscal standpoint the most im-
portant-amendment to the income tax statute is that which revises the
" Allion v. Sharp, 209 N.C. 477, 480-81, 184 S.E. 27, 29 (1936).
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methods of allocating the income of corporations doing business both in
North Carolina and elsewhere.
The general principles of the revision are: (1) domestic and foreign
corporations are made subject to the same allocation rules; (2) income
represented by certain interest, dividends, capital gains, royalties, rents,
and returns from investments, less all related expenses, is allocated
before ratios are applied; (3) the remaining income of corporations in
the business of manufacturing, producing, selling or dealing in tangible
personal property is allocated by taking the arithmetical average of
three ratios geared, respectively, to value of tangible property, payrolls,
and sales (this last being obviously intended to mean dollar volume
rather than unit volume, though it is not so specified) ; (4) there are
special provisions for railroad, telephone, and motor carrier corporations;
(5) the net income of corporations conducting businesses other than
those already mentioned is allocated on a gross receipts ratio; and (6)
a corporate taxpayer still asserting a grievance arising from the applica-
tion of these rules may appeal to the Tax Review Board.'
To the extent that, prior to 1957, some vestige of discrimination
against domestic corporations still survived, its elimination is certainly
justifiable. The same may be said for elimination of the old loaded
formulas which, keyed to the corporation's principal business in North
Carolina, not infrequently attributed too high a percentage of interstate
income to this state. Beyond these general observations, discussion of
tax policy is inappropriate in this Survey.
The Tax Study Commission set its draftsmen an extraordinarily
difficult goal when it said:
It is the belief of this Commission that any statute dealing with
the allocation of net income should be written in sufficient detail
to permit businessmen, who often are not tax experts, to de-
termine how the law would apply to their type of operations. The
provisions of the proposed statute were designed to prevent mis-
understanding of their intent.
2
Perhaps to a considerable extent this goal has been achieved; but
there are many questions-far too many to allow even a complete cata-
logue, much less full discussion, to be set forth here.
a. Pre-ratio Allocation
The provisions governing pre-ratio allocation of interest, dividends,
etc. were presented as intended primarily to eliminate, from income
partially allocable to North Carolina, income not connected with any
" G.S. § 105-134 (1957).
2
REPORT OF THE TAX STUDY COMMIISSION OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
29 (1956) (hereinafter cited as TSC REPORT).
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business partially conducted in this state.3 To some extent, at least,
as to foreign corporations, this was already required by interpretations
placed upon the Constitution of the United States.4 To that extent the
new provisions merely make explicit rules which the state already
followed when the pre-1957 corporate taxpayer insisted upon its rights.
Falling well within this generally expressed intent, interest, received
from intangible property not connected with the business partly carried
on in North Carolina, is allocated in its entirety to the principal place
of business.5 Every other provision dealing with pre-ratio allocation
of income seems to present more complex problems.
Dividends received from, and gains or losses from the sale or
other disposition of corporate stocks owned other than stocks of
a subsidiary corporation having business transactions with or
being engaged in the same or similar type of business as the tax-
payer less all related expenses and less that portion of such divi-
dends deductible under the provisions of subsection 5 of G.S.
105-147 shall be allocated to the state in which the principal place
of business of the corporation is located. For purposes of this
paragraph a corporation shall be considered to be a subsidiary if
the parent corporation owns fifty per cent (50%) or more of the
voting stock of such subsidiary.6
What is meant by "having business transactions with" the parent?
The clear implication is that the payment of the dividend is not itself a
"business transaction," though it could hardly be called eleemosynary.
3TSC REPORT 28-37.
'Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931). See also
International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947); Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S. 331
(1939); Maxwell v. Kent-Coffey Mfg. Co., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 697 (1933),
aff'd, 291 U.S. 642 (1934). For general discussion of allocation formulas and
pre-formula allocation, see 1 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAX SEarV. 11[ 91404-38 (1956).
5 G.S. § 105-134(1) (1957). "Principal place of business" is nowhere defined,
though it is stated elsewhere in the section: "That a corporation is chartered in
a particular state shall not of itself show that the corporation is transacting or
conducting a portion of its business in said state." An opinion of the Attorney
General, given to the Commissioner of Revenue on October 4, 1957, says, among
other things: that the term refers to "business domicile or the place where the
principal business activity of the corporation is conducted, which may or may
not be the same as the place of incorporation"; that the term has reference "to a
corporation incorporated in one state but whose principal internal and business
operations have their fountainhead in another state"; and that "as in all legal
matters the meaning must be developed through consideration of specific fact situa-
tions and no simple rule of thumb can be laid down." 2 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAX
SERv. (N.C.) 1f 13003 (1956). The cases may be relatively rare, but it seems
predictable that some controversies will arise over whether a corporation's principal
place of business is within or without North Carolina. (If it is outside this state,
it makes no difference to our tax revenue whether it be in Delaware, Texas, or
California.)
6 G.S. § 105-134(2) (1957). The reference to G.S. § 105-147(5) is to the pro-
vision allowing every stockholder to deduct the proportion of dividends roughly
representing profits on which the corporation has paid income tax to North Carolina.
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Is there here a broad intent to embrace something comparable to the
elusive "business purpose doctrine" of federal tax law, 7 which dis-
tinguishes (sometimes) between the operational transactions of the
-corporate business and the profit motive of its shareholders?
Why is the subsidiary's "same or similar type of business as the tax-
payer" not confined here, as with interest, to the business of the taxpayer
partially conducted in North Carolina? Other questions could be
raised about this provision, but these may suffice to indicate that the
initially tired businessman may be downright exhausted .before he de-
termines how this applies to the operations of his corporation.
"Royalties or similar income received from the use of patents, trade
marks, copyrights, secret processes, and other similar intangible rights"
are also allocated, pre-ratio, to the principal place of business.8 This is
categorical, but perhaps questionable. It seems to renounce any right
to tax even a portion of royalty payments to a foreign parent, doing
business in North Carolina, made by a North Carolina subsidiary in
the same line of business. 9 To this extent, at least, there seems to be
some departure from the Tax Study Commission's originally expressed
intent to tax 100 per cent of non-unitary income derived from sources
wholly within North Carolina.
10
Rents, royalties, and gains from realty and tangible personalty, "not
connected with the trade or business of the taxpayer," are allocated to
the state where the property is located. Here, again, there is no reference
to the business partially conducted in North Carolina. 1
Income "from any other investments, the net income from which is
not properly includable in the net apportionable income of corporations
engaged in interstate commerce under the Constitution of the United
States because it is unrelated to the business activity of the corporation
conducted partly within and partly without North Carolina, shall be
allocated to the state in which the business situs of the investment is
located; provided, that if the business situs of such investment is partly
within and partly without North Carolina it shall be apportioned by
7 See Gregory v. Helvering, 203 U.S. 465 (1935). Cf. Commissioner v. Sullivan,
210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954).
6G.S. § 105-134(3) (1957).
0 G.S. § 105-143, not amended in 1957, gives the Commissioner of Revenue some
general and some specific powers to deal with the situation in which a foreign
parent is attempting to siphon off income tax free from a North Carolina sub-
sidiary. It is doubtful that this section enables the Commissioner to cope with
the situation supposed in the text, even if we assume that the earlier statute repeals
or modifies the later one.
'* TSC REPORT 31. However, the draft attached to the Report as an Appendix
contemplated that royalties, etc. be allocated to "the state in which the principal
-lace of business of the corporation is located (or to the state in which such
rights were used)." Id. at 105.
11 G.S. § 105-134(4) (1957).
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use of the same formula as provided for apportioning the net income of
the corporation.'
2
In part, at least, this merely accepts the inevitable. However, there
is no attempt here or elsewhere to define "business situs," and the con-
cept of the split business situs, in the mind of this writer, is somewhat
vague. If an actual case of such split situs be encountered, why invoke
the usual ratio for apportioning the investment income, by comparison
to allocating between the states sharing the situs? If North Carolina
shares the situs with one other state, but the corporation does business
in ten states, application of the usual ratio might well lower the
proportion attributable to this state. On the other hand, if application
of the formula would give North Carolina a greater proportion than
division between situs states, will the allocation be valid? If the usual
ratio is initially barred from the front door for constitutional reasons,
may it subsequently be admitted through the back door? This writer
freely confesses his inability to answer these questions, as he is unable
to visualize the situation in which the split business situs will exist,
barring the possibility that there is some corporation carrying on its
investment activities in a building which straddles the state line.
It seems apparent from the above discussion that the pre-ratio alloca-
tion provisions do not reflect a consistent philosophy. Interest and in-
come from "other investments" are given pre-ratio allocation when not
connected with a trade or business carried on partially in North Carolina.
Ordinary rents received are so allocated only if not connected with any
trade or business carried on by the taxpayer, without regard to whether
the particular line of business connected with the rentals is conducted
partly in North Carolina. Dividends are so allocated unless from a
subsidiary, as defined, in the same or a similar line of business (ap-
parently carried on anywhere) or having business transactions with the
parent. Royalties from patents and similar property are so allocated,
regardless of the fact that they may be connected with a business partial-
ly conducted by the taxpayer in North Carolina. This writer is forced
to the conclusion that, in detail, the pre-ratio allocation provisions are
not dictated by the Constitution of the United States.
b. Ratio Problem.s
Having disposed of pre-ratio allocations, a few taxpayers may have
a question as to the ratio to be applied. "Where the income is derived
principally from the manufacture, production or sale of tangible personal
property or from dealing in tangible personal property the corporation
shall apportion its net apportionable income to North Carolina . .. ."
(Emphasis added.)' 8 This seems to mean that, if a corporation has
12 G.S. § 105-134(5) (1957).13 G.S. § 105-134(6) a (1957).
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pre-ratio income exceeding its manufacturing or selling income, then the
manufacturing or selling income will not be apportioned by the formula
designed for such businesses, but rather by the gross receipts formula
designed for miscellaneous businesses. A contrary construction may be
reached, but only by departing from the normal meaning of the words
used.
For purposes of the value ratio, "value" is defined as "original cost
plus additions and improvements less reserve for depreciation, unless
in the opinion of the Commissioner of Revenue the peculiar circum-
stances in any case justify a different basis, in which event the Commis-
sioner may construe 'value' to mean fair market value." 14  Is this too
vague a standard? Note that there is no mention of a finding of distor-
tion of North Carolina income resulting from application of cost less
depreciation. And, whatever "different basis" is justified, only fair
market value can be substituted. Certainly it is not intended here that
"peculiar circumstances" be found to exist whenever fair market value
would produce greater revenue for North Carolina. But what is in-
tended? For example, if a corporation followed different depreciation
policies on plants in and out of the state, or if the corporation had been
given a fast write-off on an emergency facility, 15 would that constitute
"peculiar circumstances"?
The value ratio includes realty and tangible personalty of which the
corporation is lessee. For this purpose "value" is defined for realty as
"the net annual rental rate multiplied by 8" and for personalty as "the
net annual rental rate multiplied by such figure for each type of property
as the Commissioner shall direct." 16
Note, again, that there is no standard prescribed for the Commis-
sioner's guidance-not even a vague reference to "a fair and reasonable
figure." Further, if the lessee is required to pay taxes, insurance,
repairs (quite a variable), or other charges, are these included in rent
for this purpose? Does it make any difference whether the lease
specifically labels them as "rent" or "additional rent"?
The provision delineating the payroll ratio excludes from considera-
tion the compensation of "general executive officers having company-
wide authority."17  Here the general objective is clear enough, and
presumably the "company-wide" is intended in a geographical rather
" G.S. § 105-134(6) a, 1, II (1957).
" The provision does not speak of a reasonable reserve for depreciation.6 G.S. § 105-134(6) a, 1, IV (1957). "Net" means the gross paid less gross
received from subrentals.
17 G.S. § 105-134(6) a, 2 (1957). In explanation of this, the Study Commission
said: "Although executives contribute to the production of income, their salaries
should be omitted from the payroll ratio because of the difficulty, in many cases,
of determining the state in which the major portion of their time was spent and to
insure that no company will have an incentive by reason of this factor to base such
officers outside of the State." TSC REPORT 33.
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than a functional sense; but there are bound to be questions in specific
cases as to who has such authority. And in the case of a small sales
corporation having few employees other than the principal executives,
the elimination of executives' salaries may produce distortion.
The introduction of a sales ratio may induce some manufacturing
corporations, heretofore operating exclusively in North Carolina, to
transfer some of their activities elsewhere. Sales are assigned to the
place where the goods are delivered (after all transportation, including
transportation by the purchaser) to the purchaser.' 8 This, standing
alone, does not entitle a corporation to report less than all of its income
to North Carolina, even though all of its sales are made to purchasers
outside the state. The corporation must also be doing business in at
least one other state before it is entitled to allocate any income away
from North Carolina.
Under the statute a corporation is regarded as conducting a part
of its business in another state if actually subject to a net income tax,
or franchise tax measured by net income, in such state. This is defini-
tive. It is also so regarded if it would be subject to a net income tax if
the other state adopted our income tax law. Our law levies income tax
upon "every corporation engaged in doing business in this State,"'0
but contains no definition of "doing business."
Hence, to the extent that any Commissioner of Revenue may be
motivated by a desire to protect or mayhap increase the state's collec-
tions, conflicting considerations arise. To construe a minimum of
activity in North Carolina as doing business here will increase our
revenue. To construe the same activity as doing business elsewhere may
reduce it.
This is the background of the problem posed for the manufacturing
corporation heretofore .not "doing business" in another state.20  If it
establishes a sales office in another state, operation of which will be
recognized as doing business there, it can invoke the allocation rules
and thereby proportionately reduce its North Carolina income tax. In
the extreme case in which all sales are to outside purchasers, it may
reduce the tax by one-third.
It should be emphasized that, once the operation of such a sales
office is recognized as doing business, the allocation rules apply, even
though substantial sales are still made from the North Carolina office.
Inevitably there will be experimentation with this to ascertain just what
I8 G.S. § 105-134(6) a, 3 (1957).
19 G.S. § 105-134, 2d para. .(1957). For a collection of opinions of the Attorney
General, dealing with what constitutes doing business in specified situations, see
2 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAX SEav. (N.C.) 10220 (1956).
"0 The same problem may be raised for some selling corporations, but with
them it is not a new problem, because a sales factor was applied to them prior to
1957.
[Vol. 36
NORTH CAROLINA 1957 SESSION LAWS
must be done in the out of state office to win the "doing business"
recognition. Thereupon the net saving may be measured-that is, from
the North Carolina tax saved'there must be deducted the aaditional cost
of the out of state office and any new taxes which must be paid to the
new state.2 1 If the new office largely supersedes sales activity in North
Carolina, the additional cost may be small; and if the right state is
selected, new taxes, if any, may well be small, also. Thus, some North
Carolina corporations may find the move profitable, if not provincially
patriotic. Of course, non-tax considerations will also affect corporate
decisions.
2. Allocation of Income of Unincorporated Interstate Businesses
It was the intention of the Tax Study Commission to supply the
same allocation rules for interstate businesses, whether incorporated or
not.2 2 The statutory provision designed to accomplish this reads:
Provided, that if an established unincorporated business owned
by a nonresident individual or a partnership having one or more
nonresident members is operating in one or more other states
the net income of the business attributable to North Carolina
shall be determined by multiplying the total net income of the
business by the ratio ascertained under the provisions under
G.S. 105-134, and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
accorded corporations therein. Total net income shall be the
entire gross income of the business less all expenses, taxes,
interest and other deductions allowable under this article which
were incurred in the operation of the business.
23
To this writer this provision is of most uncertain meaning. The
first sentence refers to G.S. § 105-134, which provides for pre-ratio
allocation of certain income. Yet the sentence refers to applying the
ratio to "total net income," and the second sentence makes it difficult
to construe that phrase as embracing only income which would, under
G.S. § 105-134, be subject to allocation by ratio. Yet, literally con-
strued, the two sentences may be unconstitutional. No doubt the Com-
missioner will feel constrained to construe this provision as if it really
meant what the Tax Study Commission recommended.
3. Employees' Death Benefits
In general conformity with the federal law,2 4 the new statute excludes
from gross income up to $5,000 in payments, received by the "estate,
" If such a new tax is a net income tax, or a franchise tax measured by net
income, then our statute requires our Commissioner to recognize operation of the
sales office as doing business elsewhere and the right to allocation is established.
"TSC REPORT 37.
"G.S. § 105-142(c) (1957).
TINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 101(b).
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widow or heirs"'25 of an employee, paid by or on behalf of an employer
and by reason of the death of the employee.26  However, at least as to
the beneficiaries specified, the G.S. provision is an improvement on the
federal statute, since it makes very explicit the fact that such payments
in excess of "$5,000 are includable in gross income--i.e., are no longer
classifiable as gifts.
27
The new state statute also provides that an employer may deduct:
"the amount of the salary or other compensation of an employee which
is paid for a period of not more than 24 months after the employee's death
to his estate, widow, or heirs provided such payment is made in recogni-
tion of services rendered by the employee prior to his death and is
reasonable in amount.
'28
There is no counterpart to this in the federal statute, but a similar
rule has been recognized by the Treasury.20  It will be noted that "the
amount of salary or other compensation of an employee," as used here,
is not so broad as a payment "by or on behalf of an employer .. .by
reason of the death of the employee," as used in the exclusion provision.
It seems that there could be a payment, made directly by the employer,
which would qualify for the exclusion and yet not entitle the employer
to a deduction-for example, a payment not stated in terms of, and
having no direct relation to, the deceased employee's salary. Probably a
" The federal language is "beneficiaries or the estate" and, in this respect,
seems preferable. However, it seems unlikely that the state authorities will give the
new state provision a narrow construction (unless for the purpose of denying a
deduction to the employer). Because the new provision begins with inclusion
and proceeds to exclusion, the effect of a narrow construction could be to exclude,
as a gift, any such payment to other beneficiaries, regardless of amount. In fact,
regardless of the position taken by the state administrative authorities, and regard-
less of the anomalous situation acceptance of the argument would produce, such a
construction may be urged by a non-heir beneficiary so fortunate as to receive a
sum in excess of $5,000.
2- G.S. § 105-141 (a) (1957). This, like the federal statutes, provides an
aggregate exclusion for all payments, regardless of the number of employers who
make payments. In general, it also conforms to the federal provisions regarding
nonforfeitable rights, but omits some of the federal provisions regarding annuities.
" Originally, federal authorities treated payments to widows as gifts. I.T. 3329,
1939-2 Cum. BuLL. 153. Subsequently, they ruled that any payment made on
account of the prior services of a deceased employee was taxable to the recipient.
I.T. 4027, 1950-2 CuM. BULL. 9. Since amendment of the federal statute, the
Tax Court has refused to follow this later ruling for pre-1954 years, holding such
receipts to be excludable gifts. Elizabeth R. Matthews, P-H 1956 T.C. Mem. Dec.
56046. See also Estate of Edward Bausch v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d
Cir. 1951), holding taxable a payment made to the employee's estate. Present
INT. REv. CoD OF 1954, § 101(b), provides an exclusion lihiited to $5,000,
but does not state clearly and flatly that sums above $5,000 must be included. Thus,
the section does not absolutely rule out the argument that the entire sum received
is excludable as a gift. However, by implication, in singling out these payments
for specific treatment, Congress intended to remove them from the gift category.
'sG.S. § 105-147(16) (1957).
"9 U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.404(a)-12 (1956). This deals with amounts "paid as
a death benefit to the beneficiaries of an employee (for example, by continuing
his salary for a reasonable period) ." See also Rev. Rul. 54-625, 1954-25 Cum. BULL.
85.
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little foresight in the use of terminology by the employer could avoid
this.
Conversely, if the amount is still reasonable in relation to salary, the
employer may deduct more than $5,000. The maximum exclusion has no
bearing upon that.
4. Annuities
North Carolina has now adopted the federal plan80 for taxing income
from annuities.3 ' Though preferable to the old 3 per cent rule, which
this state continued to follow prior to 1957, the federal provision is quite
complicated. But, since taxpayers must already surmount the compli-
cations for federal purposes, their lot is no worse as a result of the
state's, "Me, too."
At least, that is true of taxpayers whose annuities start after January
1, 1957, because they can report the same amount annually on both state
and federal returns. However, if the state statute is applied as written,
many taxpayers whose annuities began prior to January 1, 1957, will
report different amounts. For example, the simplest type of case is
that of the taxpayer with a straight life annuity which began in 1953.
.For purposes of the current federal provision his annuity starting date
was January 1, 1954. His investment (unrecovered cost) and expected
return (determined by reference to his life expectancy) were computed
as of that time. The ratio of the investment to the expected return be-
came his ratio of exclusion, and this continues as a fixed percentage as
long as he lives.
For state purposes, his annuity starting date is January 1, 1957.
His investment as of that date is lower than it was in 1954 by the amount
excluded from gross income during the three year period. His expected
return will also be lower, but the percentage of reduction in expected
return need not be, and probably will not be, the same as the percentage
of reduction in investment 3 2  Consequently, in all probability, while
the computation principle is identical, he has a different exclusion ratio
IxT. REV. CoDE oF 1954, § 72.
"G.S. § 105-141.1 (1957). There are some minor word changes of no
particular significance. Also, the North Carolina statute omits the federal pro-
visions dealing with payments in discharge of alimony and with "face-amount
certificates."
" The percentage of reduction in investment cannot be determined without
knowing the total amount of gross receipts over the three-year period and the
relation this bears to the 3 per cent annually included in gross income. The
percentage of reduction in expected return cannot be known without knowing
the age of the particular annuitant on January 1, 1954. The life expectancy of
an annuitant on January 1, 1957, is longer than the same annuitant's expectancy
on January 1, 1954, less three years. But the relative change in expectancy varies
with age level. For example, for males, life expectancy at age 6 is 65 years and at
age 9 is 62.3 years; for ages 60 and 63 the figures are 18.2 and 16.2; for ages 80
and 83 they are 7.5 and 6.2.
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on January 1, 1957, and the amount he must include in his state gross
income will differ from the amount included for federal purposes.
Be that as it may, the state now presumably inherits the voluminous
federal regulations on the subject (this being about the only way in
which the state acquires income tax regulations). In this connection,
there is one peculiarity which this writer does not understand, and
hence merely points out. The new provision dealing with expected
return expressly refers to annuity tables used by the Federal Internal
Revenue Service at the time as of which the computation is made. This
seems to contemplate automatic change in the effect of the North Caro-
lina statute whenever federal authorities change their tables. Passing
the question of whether this is a valid delegation of authority in futuro,
it is peculiar that elsewhere, in the provision dealing with adjustment of
investment when there is a refund feature,3 3 the reference is to tables
prescribed by the Commissioner, presumably meaning the State Com-
missioner of Revenue.
5. Income of Trust or Estate and Income of Beneficiary
The Tax Study Commission pointed out that the pre-1957 statute
could tax trust or estate income twice-once to the trust or estate in the
year received and accumulated by the trust or estate, and again to the
beneficiary in a subsequent year in which it is distributed or becomes
distributable to the beneficiary.3 4 It recommended that this be changed,
with the consequence that the 1957 statute taxes the beneficiary upon
his receipt of the income only when it "has not been included as net
income of the estate or trust subject to tax during any prior year.
'35
The ostensible simplicity of this provision may prove to be deceptive.
Does "net income . . . subject to tax" require that a tax actually have
been paid? That is, what is the status of income reported by the trust
but covered by the trust's $1,000 exemption? Let us assume (solely
" For the benefit of those readers who do not immediately grasp the significance
of the refund feature, the following excerpt from the report of the U.S. Senate
Finance Committee on the 1954 Internal Revenue Code is helpfully appended:
The determination of the value of the refund feature is to be without discount
for interest and is the net actuarial value at rate of interest zero of the
refund payment or payments certain as of the annuity starting date. It will
be obtained by.entering actuarial tables to be provided by the Secretary or
his delegate with the whole number of years nearest to the quotient of the
guaranteed amount divided by the payments per annum and with the age of
the annuitant at the annuity starting date. The tables will yield a figure (to
be applied without regard to whether the annuity is payable annually or at
more frequent intervals) for each $1 per annum of annuity payment. This
figure will then be multiplied by the rate of annual payment provided in
the contract, the result being the value of the refund for such contract, which
will be subtracted from the investment in the contract determined under
subsection (c) (1).
11 TSC REPoRT 20. Since the Commission also estimated that revenue loss
from eliminating the duplication would be negligible, the implication is that this
was not an area in which literal compliance wth the law was universal.
35 G.S. § 105-142(1) (1957).
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for the purpose of raising further questions) that some tax must have
been paid. If a trust has accumulated income of $10,000, of which
$5,000 was covered by prior years' exemptions, with tax having been
paid on the remainder, what are the tax consequences when, in 1958,
the trustee pays a beneficiary $5,000 from the accumulation? Is the pay-
ment to be attributed to the taxed or non-taxed accumulation, or pro-
rated?
Or, suppose that a trust owns and rents depreciable property, ac-
cumulating the rents and reporting them for tax purposes, taking de-
preciation deductions. Subsequently the entire accumulation is dis-
tributed. What is the status of so much of the distribution as would
not have been available save for the depreciation deductions ?36
Other questions will undoubtedly arise. Fortunately, because of the
relatively small spread in North Carolina tax rates the problems are not
so significant as they would be if the federal rates were involved; but
in a few cases they may involve substantial sums.37
A second new provision dealing with the relation between trust
income and beneficiary income is:
Where a taxpayer is the beneficiary of a distributable trust and
where dividend income is received by the trust and paid by the
trustee to the beneficiary, the dividends or the portion of such
dividends which would otherwise be deductible under the pro-
visions of this section shall be deductible to the beneficiary if
such dividends are distributed or distributable to the beneficiary
during the taxable year and are included in the gross income of
the beneficiary except that the deduction of the same dividends
may not be claimed by both the fiduciary and the beneficiary.
The amount of the deduction by the beneficiary shall be that
portion of his income received from the trust as the deductible
portion of dividends received as income by the trust bears to
the gross income of the trust from all sources taxable under this
article.38
"The saving in North Carolina tax from a depreciation deduction would be,
at the maximum, 7% of the deduction. But federal tax saving from the same
deduction might be substantial. This somewhat- complicates matters. Because,
on both returns, the entire deduction reduced net income, the entire saving repre-
sents an accumulation never reflected in "net income . . . subject to tax" in
North Carolina.
3' The small North Carolina rate spread fully justifies North Carolina in not
adopting the delightful, and somewhat futile, complexities of the federal five year
throwback rule. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, §§ 665-68. But it is true that the North
Carolina law offers opportunities to save taxes, up to 7 cents on the dollar, through
the use of accumulation trusts.
38 G.S. § 105-147(5) (1957). As pointed out by the Tax Study Commission,
a provision with a similar purpose, though less detailed, was contained in our
statute prior to 1955, when it was inadvertently eliminated.
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Once more the general objective of the draftsman may be readily
discerned; and once more there are questions of interpretation. A
minor one arises from the fact that the provision, in one part, seems to
be confined to amounts "paid" to the beneficiary, whereas elsewhere
it requires only that the amounts be "distributable" and included in
the ben eficiary's gross income.
Of more importance is the uncertain meaning of "distributable trust"
-the type of trust which must exist before the provision is applicable.
Does it mean that the entire income of the trust must be distributable?
If so, then if there is any accumulation, the beneficiary loses the de-
duction even though a substantial sum, traceable to dividends, is in fact
paid to him from the nonaccumulated portion of trust income. But if
the trust income must all be distributable, then the prohibition against
deduction by both trustee and beneficiary seems unnecessary and mean-
ingless.
Even if the provision be confined to trusts required to distribute all
income, there are further problems. For example, suppose such a trust,
with a single beneficiary, receives in 1958 $10,000 in dividends which
are 50 per cent deductible. The trust also owns realty which produces
gross rental of $10,000. The trust instrument requires the trustee to
pay taxes, insurance, and maintenance on the realty (amounting in
1958 to $3,500), and pay over the entire balance of rents to the bene-
ficiary. The trustee pays the beneficiary $16,500 less trustee's com-
mission. Applying the ratio set forth in the statute, what is the amount
of the dividend deduction to which the beneficiary is entitled? Com-
mon sense indicates that it ought to be $5,000 less trustee's commission
on that sum; but this result may well be precluded by the reference to
"the gross income of the trust."
If it be assumed that the provision applies in any situation in which
a trust has some distributable income, even though other trust income
is accumulated, there are additional questions. For example, what is
the beneficiary's deduction in a year in which he receives a payment
from the trustee which comes in part from current dividend income of
the trust and in part from dividend accumulations of prior years?
Conceding that the beneficiary clearly is entitled to some deduction for
the part of the current payment representing deductible dividends cur-
rently received by the trust, of what significance, if any, is it that the
accumulation is from prior dividends received by the trust, but never
taxed to the trust because covered by the $1,000 exemption?3D And
" This example could be changed slightly to present a different question. Sup-
pose that in the year the dividend income was accumulated, the trust properly de-
ducted a portion of dividends received, but still had net taxable income on which
tax was paid. When the part of the accumulation representing this deducted
portion of the dividends is subsequently paid to the beneficiary, is it includable in
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assuming (without deciding) that the accumulation payment is includable
in the beneficiary's gross income, but he is allowed no dividend deduction
on account of it because of the statutory reference to "the taxable year,"
how is the ratio to be applied? If the trust's currently deductible divi-
dends equal one-half of the current gross income of the trust, may the
beneficiary deduct one-half of both the payment from current trust in-
come and the payment from prior accumulations? If the statute means
what it says, the answer is "yes."
6. Basis of Property Received by Parent upon Liquidation of a Subsidiary
When one corporation buys the stock of another corporation and
liquidates the newly acquired subsidiary (recognizing no gain or loss
on the liquidation), the parent would naturally prefer to have as its
basis on the subsidiary's property the purchase price of the stock,
wherever such purchase price exceeds the subsidiary's basis on the
property.
In 1954 Congress elected to permit this for federal tax purposes.
40
North Carolina has now provided the same opportunity.41 The op-
portunity is not unlimited. The parent must, within a twelve month
period, acquire at least 80 per cent of voting power and 80 per cent of
all stock other than nonvoting preferred; and the plan of liquidation
must be adopted within two years after completion of such acquisition.
(There is no time limit for completing the liquidation.)
The Tax Study Commission said of this provision (among other
things) :
This provision is also designed to prevent a corporation from
buying the stock of a defunct corporation solely to acquire a
'loss' for income tax purposes. This can develop when the book
value of the property of such corporation greatly exceeds the
actual value of the property. In such cases under the North
Carolina law the basis would be the book value, then if the
property were sold for actual value the receiving corporation
would be able to claim a loss not actually realized.
42
The last sentence of the quotation refers, of course, to pre-1957 law.
the beneficiary's gross income under G.S. § 105-142(d) because not "included as
net income" by the trust in the prior year? If so, then the dividend deduction
cannot be taken by the beneficiary in the year he reports the payment, because the
trustee has already taken it. G.S. § 105-147(5) expressly bars the beneficiary
from taking the same deduction.
, INT. REv. CoDa or" 1954, § 334(b). At an earlier date, at least one taxpayer
had been required to take the stock price as its basis when the price was lower
than the subsidiary's basis. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 187
F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). The court regarded the entire transaction as in effect a
purchase of assets.
"G.S. § 105-144(e) (1957).
,TSC REPORT 17.
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But it is most doubtful that the new provision is the effective preventive
envisioned by the Commission. It seems that the purchasing parent
need only wait one day beyond the specified two years to adopt the plan
of liquidation. The new provision then becomes inapplicable and, upon
subsequent liquidation, the parent acquires the subsidiary's basis on the
property.43 In fact, the situation seems to be, under both state and
federal statutes, that the purchasing parent, by selecting an appropriate
date for adoption of the liquidation plan, may in every case secure as its
basis either the stock price or the subsidiary's basis, whichever is higher.
7. Non-amortization of Bond Premium
The Tax Study Commission recommended that taxpayers be al-
lowed to elect to amortize premiums paid for bonds bearing taxable
interest and be required to amortize premiums on bonds bearing tax
exempt interest. In both respects this recommendation conforms to
federal law.44 The only part of the recommendation which survived is
the definition of "bond," which is borrowed from the federal statute.4"
The state provision, as finally enacted, prohibits amortization of
bond premiums and provides that they shall be considered part of cost
in determining profit or loss (upon sale, maturity, or other disposition).
The new provision presents only questions of policy. Its meaning seems
quite clear.
8. Other Changes
A large number of other changes were effected in the income tax
statute. Many of them are of minor significance, both legally and from
the fiscal standpoint. Some others represent important shifts of state
policy toward conformity with federal policy-for example, the new
provisions governing alimony, income in respect of decedents, gain on
sale of personal residences, and (superseding the former limitation on
short-term losses) wash sales.
In general these latter changes seem to conform our statutes so close-
ly to the federal statutes that the new state legal problems are the same as
the legal problems already presented by the federal provisions. Thus,
along with these problems, the state will presumably inherit still more
volumes of federal regulations.
In the large one can only applaud the trend toward conformity of
state and federal provisions. But the members of our General Assembly
43 In the absence of the new statute, a court might, considering all the circum-
stances, decide that a particular purchase was essentially a purchase of assets
rather than stock, and assign the stock price as basis, regardless of time lines.
Cf. Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir 1951).
However, when the legislative body deliberately establishes such lines, it is most
doubtful that the courts should disregard them.
11 TSC REPORT 21.
"T I.T. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 171 (d).
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should be apprised that, as they move closer toward the goal of uni-
formity, they must step very lively to keep up with the constant changes
of tune emanating from Congress and the Treasury.
Further, it seems probable that the state revenue authorities, as
they become more and more confined (and perplexed) by the intricate
score reflected in Treasury regulations, will fretfully pine for those
halcyon days when they played everything by ear.
GIFT TAx
To accord with the federal law the gift tax exclusion is raised from
$1,000 to $3,000 and granted with respect to all except gifts of future
interests.' Since that term is not defined, it will presumably be inter-
preted in the light of the long series of federal cases on the subject 2 as
meaning roughly those gifts where present right of enjoyment is de-
ferred even if the title is not. That test produced some startling re-
sults, e.g., the determination that a trust with current income fully
available to the beneficiary and in addition the chance that he might
have, as needed, parts or all of the corpus was entirely a gift of a future
interest, though if the latter possibility had been omitted the income
interest would have been present. 3 Thus, give him a present interest
plus something more and you give him no valuable present interest.
Congress corrected that particular quirk by specific language,4 but since
North Carolina has not adopted that language the matter is here left
in doubt.
In respect of gifts to minors, however, we did adopt substantially
the federal language and, hereafter, gifts which follow the provisions of
the act in making income and principal expendable for the infant's needs
throughout his infancy and principal payable to him on his majority will
qualify for the $3,000 exclusion newly granted.5
1 C. 1340, § 6.
- See, e.g., Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1945); United States v.
Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Stifel v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2d
Cir. 1952) ; Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951) ; Hessen-
bruch v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1950); Shefner v. Knox, 131
F. Supp. 936 (D. Minn. 1955).
'Evans v. Commissloner, 198 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1952); Kniep v. Commissioner,
172 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1949).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b) (last sentence).
2 Gifts under the recent custodial act, see Fleming, The North Carolina Gift
of Securities to Minors Law, 34 N.C.L. REv. 207 (1956), which were declared
to be taxable gifts, Opinion of the Attorney General of North Carolina, CCH
INH., EsT. & Girt TAx REP. (7th ed.) 18549 (N.C. July 3, 1956), seem clearly
covered by the amendment and entitled to the exclusion. They may be taxable
nevertheless in the estate of the donor if he dies before the infant has attained age
twenty-one. Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-32 Cum. BULL. 20; see Note, 69 HARV. L. Rlv.
1476 (1956). Whether a trust for longer than an infant's minority but giving him
or his guardian power to take the principal at any time will now qualify on
Kieckhefer reasoning is not certain. Congress may be thought to have put
specific limitations on its liberalization of the future interests doctrine. But ef.
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In adopting also the federal language along with its requirement for
benefits that the gift provide for payment of unexpended corpus into
the estate of a beneficiary who dies during minority "or as he may ap-
point under a general power of appointment" we may have introduced
two uncertainties: (1) What is a general power of appointment? The
federal act has its own definition6 since federal tax consequences depend
on the distinction between general and special powers. But our in-
heritance tax section has drawn no distinction, 7 and we are without
statutory definition. Since the declared purpose of the amendment was
to bring our law in harmony with the Internal Revenue Code,8 perhaps
our amendment should be considered to have adopted the specific federal
definition of a general power. (2) Does an infant have power to ap-
point either during life or by will9 If he does not the language on that
subject, entirely appropriate in the federal act which will be concerned
with infant decedents in all states, may be a snare in our act.
INHERIUTAN CE TAX
The first amendment to Schedule A seeks to make sure that no
double exemptions result from the privilege granted a widow to claim
her minor children's exemptions in addition to her own,1 when by the will
of her husband she takes "substantially all of his property." If the
widow so elects, the exemption will now be expressly denied to the
children, as the Tax Study Commission says has been the practice, 2 per-
haps of doubtful validity, under the old law. In most cases the statute
carries out a benign policy toward a widow and dependent children by
assuring them together some exemptions they might otherwise lose,
but there may occasionally be a case where a wife could exercise the
option to the detriment of a child legatee for whom she was not caring.3
The most significant amendment to the inheritance tax law is, how-
ever, that which substitutes a tax credit in place of a property exclusion
in the case of property which has borne an inheritance tax within two
Proposed Gift Tax Reg. § 25.2503-4(c) (Jan. 3, 1957) ; William Goehner. 28 T.C.
No. 57 (May 29, 1957) ; George W. Perkins, 27 T.C. No. 67 (Dec. 26, 1956).
6 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2514 (e).
7G.S. § 105-2 Fifth and Sixth (1950). 8 TSC REPORT 87, 90.
' See G.S. § 31-1 (1950); 2 SIimEs & SAnrH, FUTURE INTERESTS § 971 (2d ed.
1956) ; In re Reynolds, 206 N.C. 276, 290, 173 S.E. 789, 796 (1934) (Here the
apparent invalidity of the exercise of the power may have been based on an in-
terpretation of the instrument rather than on legal incapacity. Since the point was
not dealt with in the concurring opinions the pronouncements are not only unclear
but may be dicta.) ; Owens v. Owens, 305 Ky. 460, 204 S.W.2d 580 (1947).
Quaere how far want of capacity might be affected by emancipation.
IC. 1340, § 1(a). amending the last proviso of G.S. § 105-4(b) (1950).
2 TSC REPORT 87.
' Unless the amount of the bequest to the child was sufficient to make the
wife's share of the estate less than "substantially all." Such slippery phrases
generally serve well enough in administrative hands but invite litigation.
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prior years.4 The federal government made a similar change in the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954,5 but there were additional reasons for
the change in North Carolina because ours is not an estate tax but an
inheritance tax6 with varying rates and exemptions to different classes
of takers and an exclusion of the property might give freedom from tax
to high rate Class B takers because a prior smaller tax had been paid
by lower rate Class A people. 7
Other differences between the new North Carolina section and the
federal provision merit comment. No credit is here given for taxes paid
on the passing of property in the estate of one who died more than two
years before. Accordingly a taker from a second decedent either gets
the maximum tax credit allowed or he gets none. The federal period
is ten years and the credit is proportionately reduced in accordance with
the remoteness of the prior death.
Furthermore the federal law extends its benefits to contemplation
of death cases by allowing a credit for taxes paid on the property in the
estate of one who dies up to two years after the present decedent. Thus
if A gives property in contemplation of death in January 1955 and dies
in January. 1957 but the donee has died in the interim, the donee's estate
can have the benefit of a "previously taxed" property credit though it
is for a tax yet to be ascertained and paid. In its newly adopted section
on recurring taxes, however, North Carolina seems not to have given
any relief in contemplation of death cases.8 (The language refers only
to "former decedent" and to "prior transfer.")
By contrast with the complicated federal formula for determining the
amount of the tax credit the North Carolina formula is simple indeed.
But it appears that in many cases the North Carolina credit will exceed
the tax due on the second transfer 0 and that then, for anything the
section says,'1 the excess will be credited on the tax due by the final
taker on other property he received from the second decedent which had
not been previously taxed.' 2 This is something the counterpart of which
could not happen under the elaborate federal law. Whether that was
4 C. 1340, § 1(d).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013.Basically, that is. See G.S. § 105-7 (1950).
These reasons are reviewed in TSC REPORT 88-89.
'Though, since G.S. § 105-2 Third (1950), has no three-year cut off period like
that in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2035, we may have a larger proportion of taxable
gifts in contemplation of death than does the federal government.
IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2013(b).
0 At times, of course, it will be less not only because the first taker was in Class
A and the second in Class B, but because of the varying size of the total gift and
the consequent varying rates.
"Except any faint inference from its title, "Recurring taxes."
12 "[E] ach transferee . . . shall be allowed a tax credit . . . ." Note that it
is not said that it is against the tax now assessed in respect of the previously taxed
property, or that it is limited to that amount.
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intended is not known but doubted; whether it is desirable may depend
on one's point of view.
TRADE REGULATION
The 1957 legislature enacted statutes designed to provide for the
voluntary inspection of meat and meat products (C. 1379) ; to protect
the public from unsanitary food and/or lodging establishments (C.
1214); to eliminate plant pests (C. 985); to protect the public from
fraudulent going-out-of-business and/or fire sales (C. 1058); and to
protect the public from household cleaners containing volatile substances
capable of producing toxic effect (C. 1241). Although there are com-
mon legal problems in many of these statutes, there are enough dif-
ferences to warrant individual treatment.
THE VOLUNTARY MEAT INSPECTION ACT
The meat inspection act, C. 1379, authorizes the Commissioner of
Agriculture to enter into voluntary agreements with meat and meat by-
products producers, processors, and retailers whereby the Commissioner,
after inspecting the sanitation of the plant facilities where the meat
products are processed, gives those who pass the inspection the right
to identify their meat with an official stamp of approval. There is no
requirement that meat processors participate in the agreements con-
templated by the act; and those who enter into the voluntary agreements
and fail to pass the sanitary inspection can continue to sell the meat
without the official stamp. The cost of operating this program is to be
borne by the person receiving the service, i.e., the meat producers and
processors who enter into the voluntary agreements. In essence, this
statute contemplates a privately financed arrangement whereby the state
of North Carolina "endorses" and thereby gives a competitive advantage
to the meat processors who desire to maintain sanitary plant facilities.
As no taxes are to be spent on this program the statute cannot be
attacked under the provision of article V, section 3 of the Constitution
of North Carolina that "Taxes shall be levied only for public purposes,"1
but is this a "void" "private or special act" within the meaning of article
III, section 29? Should the Commissioner exercise favoritism in enter-
ing into the voluntary agreements, it would seem that the statute
probably would be vulnerable to attack on this score.
SANITATION OF ESTABLISHMENTS PROVIDING FOOD AND LODGING
The act relating to the sanitation of establishments providing food
and lodging, C. 1214, is coercive, not voluntary. This statute, an
' As to what are public purposes for which taxes may be levied, see Note, 25
N.C.L. REv. 504 (1947).
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amendment of article 5 of chapter 72 of the General Statutes, requires
the State Board of Health to prepare and enforce rules and regulations
governing the sanitation of any establishment where food and drink is
served for pay, or where lodging accommodations are provided, and to
license only those establishments which meet the minimum sanitation re-
quirements as established by the Board. The Board is authorized to
police its regulations by means of court injunctions against those who
operate without a permit or who otherwise violate any Board adopted
rule or regulation. Boarding houses having regular boarders, private
clubs, and church, civic or charity sponsored box suppers and the like
are excluded from the purview of the act.
The act on its face appears to be proper. The sanitation of public
eating and lodging establishments seems sufficiently related to the public
health so as to justify a state system of control by means of a licensing
statute.2 The legislature directs the State Board of Health to prepare
and enforce rules and regulations governing the sanitation of food and
lodging establishments, but the area of Board discretion is confined to
such matters as the cleanliness of the utensils, adequacy of ventilation,
methods of food preparation, health of employees and the like, so there
is no problem of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.3
It seems reasonable to distinguish between public restaurants and
private clubs; between public lodging houses and private boarding




C. 985 re-writes and substantially extends article 36 of chapter 106 of
the General Statutes, dealing with crop pests. The new G.S. § 106-419
defines "plant pests" in ambiguous and all inclusive terms, and the
following section authorizes the Board of Agriculture to adopt regula-
tions so as to eradicate and prevent the spread of plant pests within the
state, from within the state to points outside the state, and from points
2"Licensing legislation, although it does restrict liberty to enter an occupation,
is valid if reasonably calculated to protect the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare." Hanft and Hamrick, Regimentatior under Licensbtg Statutes,
17 N.C.L. REv. 1, 10 (1938).
The legislative body must declare the policy of the law, fix legal principles
which are to control in given cases, and provide adequate standards for the
guidance of the administrative body or officer empowered to execute the law.
Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52,
74 S.E.2d 310 (1953). Cf. Note, Delegation of Legislative Authority to Individuals,
31 N.C.L. REv. 308 (1953).
'The predominant limitation on the legislative power to classify is that the
classification must be reasonable and rest upon some substantial difference between
the classes. A special classification by statute of wholesale grocers operating
a cold storage chamber of some character for the preservation of fresh meats, as
distinguished from those who handled only canned meats not requiring refrigeration,
was sustained in Southern Grain Provision Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N.C. 661, 155
S.E. 557 (1930).
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outside the state to points within the state. These regulations may take
the form of area quarantine or may take other form including the regula-
tion of common carriers transporting "things liable to harbor" plant
pests. The vagueness of definition and regulatory form raises a serious
problem of legislative delegation of unbridled authority. The vagueness
of the statute raises another problem: What vital state interest is sought
to be protected that justifies an interference with interstate transport ?0
A third problem arising from the above described portion of the statute
is that of federal preemption. If the Congress or one of its agencies
such as the Interstate Commerce Commission or the Department of
Agriculture has acted or intentionally refrained from acting in the area
of interstate transport of plant pests, any state action in this area is null
and void if it conflicts with federal policy.
7
The next section, G.S. § 106-421, as re-written declares that plants
and premises infested or infected by a "dangerous" plant pest constitute
a public nuisance unless the dangerous plant pest is present "under such
regulations as the Board of Agriculture may prescribe." Such "danger-
ous" plant pests must be eradicated by the owner of the premises upon
notice by the Commissioner of Agriculture. When does a plant pest
on the property of Mr. A become dangerous? If harmless to Mr. A's
tobacco, is it "dangerous because it might harm Mr. B's apples ten miles
away? If it might harm Mrs. C's gladioli fifteen miles away? The
statute does not tell us. The statute here seems to attempt an unlimited
delegation of legislative authority s It might also raise the question as
to the right of the state to invade and condemn one man's property for
the protection of other property of less value to the state.9
' See note 3 supra.6 Th  right of states to enact quarantine laws is not disputed unless interstate
commerce is regulated "beyond what is necessary for any proper quarantine."
Smith v. St. Louis & S.W. Ry., 181 U.S. 248 (1901). The state cannot prove the
quarantine law proper by "simply invoking the convenient apologetics of the police
power," but must prove a state interest justifying interference with interstate
commerce. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
' Where the congressional "power to legislate exists, it often happens that there
is only a partial exercise of that power by the federal government. In such cases
the state may legislate freely upon those phases of the commerce which are left
unregulated by the nation. But where the United States exercises its power of
legislation so as to conflict with a regulation of the state, either specifically or by
implication, the state legislation becomes inoperative and the federal legislation
exclusive in its application." Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148,
155-56 (1942).
The Federal Plant Quarantine Act, 33 STAT. 1269 (1905), as amended, 7
U.S.C. §§ 141-49 (1953), provides in pertinent part that "the Secretary of Agri-
culture, in cooperation with authorities of the States concerned . . . is authorized
and directed to apply such methods for the control of incipient or emergency out-
breaks of insect pests or plant diseases . . . as may be necessary," 50 STAr. 57
(1938), 7 U.S.C. § 148 (1953).
* See note 3 .spra.
Virginia enacted a carefully drawn Cedar Rust Act authorizing the destruc-
tion of cedar trees harboring plant diseases dangerous to apple trees. This
statute was attacked on the theory that "there is not, in the American theory of
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The new G.S. § 106-422 authorizes the Commissioner's agents to
enter upon and inspect any premises between the hours of sunrise and
sunset during working days to determine the presence of injurious plant
pests. It is not clear that any such entry may be made without first
obtaining a search warrant.10
The statute on nursery inspection, G.S. § 106-423, in its new form,
authorizes the Board of Agriculture to (1) define nursery stock, (2)
license all those who buy and sell nursery stock, and (3) inspect annually
all plant nurseries where narcissus bulbs are commercially raised. Here
again is the problem of delegation of legislative authority" and, addi-
tionally, the problem of whether the commerce in nursery stock (as Yet
undefined) is sufficiently vital to state interests as to justify state regula-
tion.1
2
FALSE ADVERTISEMENT OF GOING-OUT-OF-BUSINESS SALES
The false advertisement act, C. 1058, makes it illegal for merchants
to advertise a sale as a "closing-out," "lost our lease," "fire," etc. sale
without first obtaining a license from the clerk of the city or town in
which the sale is to be held. The clerk is required to issue the license
when satisfied that the proposed sale is bona fide. Additionally,
merchants are prohibited from acquiring additional stock in preparation
for or during the continuance of the sale. The statute so far seems free
from legal problems, as the state has a right to protect its citizens from
false and misleading advertising. 3 However; the statute is made
government, any room for the view that one man's property may be taken or
destroyed . . . in order to enhance the property values or the financial prosperity
of another." The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute
on the ground that "the state was under the necessity of making a choice beween
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other" and that "when
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save another
which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public."
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279 (1928).
The North Carolina statute differs from the Virginia Cedar Rust Act in that
the North Carolina legislature did not exercise any judgment but delegated this
task to the Board of Agriculture.
10 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1950), concerned a case brought
under a District of Columbia regulation making it unlawful to interfere with or
prevent the inspection of a building reported to be in an unsanitary condition.
Mrs. Little, who was charged with violation of the regulation, contended that
"no sanitary inspection can ever be made by health officers without a search warrant,
except -with a property owner's consent." The District of Columbia argued
that "the Fourth Amendment has no application whatever to inspections and in-
vestigations made by health officers." As a "decision of the constitutional re-
quirements for a search in this particular case might have far reaching and
unexpected implications as to closely related questions," the Court applied its
general policy of deciding a case, wherever possible, on non-constitutional grounds
and affirmed the lower court on the theory that the actions of Mrs. Little had not
come within the terms of the statutory prohibitions.
1' See note 3 supra.
22 See note 2 supra.
"' State v. Pelly, 221 N.C. 487, 20 S.E.2d 850 (1942).
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applicable to nineteen counties only, thus raising a serious question as
to its constitutionality under article 11, section 29, of the Constitution
of North Carolina, which voids local and private acts relating to trade.
14
Toxic HOUSEHOLD CLEANERS STATUTE
The toxic household cleaners statute, C. 1241, makes it illegal for
anyone to sell household cleaners capable of producing toxic effects with-
out labeling the product with words of caution and directions for safe
and proper use. The statute provides that its provisions shall be ap-
plicable only with respect to intrastate manufacture and sale in the
event the Congress of the United States shall hereafter enact legislation
designed to regulate the interstate distribution, etc. of hazardous articles
in packages suitable for or intended for household use. Congress has
already enacted the Federal Caustic Poison Act15 which regulates the
labeling of dangerous caustic or corrosive substances sold in interstate
commerce. Does this federal statute regulating the labeling of household
cleaners containing dangerous caustic or corrosive substances deprive
North Carolina of a right to regulate the labeling of these household
cleaners if they also contain volatile substances capable of producing a
toxic effect? In an analogous situation the United States Supreme
Court has held that a state cannot require those in interstate commerce
to affix additional words of caution to goods which met the labeling
requirement of the Federal Food and Drug Act."' The issue is one of
congressional intent, i.e., did Congress intend by the Federal Caustic




C. 587 amends G.S. § 31-24 to authorize the resident clerk of the
superior court to take the affidavit-for the purposes of probate-of a
witness to a will who resides in a county other than where the will is
offered for probate. The former law required this affidavit to be taken
by a notary public of such county. Now, either the clerk or a notary
may take it.
C. 587 also amends G.S. § 31-25 to authorize the clerk before whom
probate is sought to issue a commission to take the depositions of
witnesses "residing outside of the county" in which the will is to be
" State v. Chestnutt, 241 N.C. 401, 85 S.E.2d 297 (1955) ; Carolina-Virginia
Coastal Highway v. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 237 N.C. 52, 74 S.E.2d 310
(1953) ; State v. Nixon, 215 N.C. 161, 1 S.E.2d 521 (1939).1144 STAT. 1406 (1927), 15 U.S.C. §§ 401-11 (1953).
1 McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
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probated. This changes the law which authorized the clerk to issue a
commission to take depositions of witnesses who resided "more than
seventy-five miles from the place where the will is to be probated."
These changes in the law serve the purpose of simplifying the probate
of wills where attesting witnesses reside at a distance from the place of
probate.
